Bill S. Woody D.B.A. Woody Drilling Co. v. Bert Rhodes and Vaughn Rhodes : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
Bill S. Woody D.B.A. Woody Drilling Co. v. Bert Rhodes and Vaughn 
Rhodes : Appellant's Brief 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Ted S. Perry; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Woody v. Rhodes, No. 11732 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4851 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE-------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- l 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--····--·------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -----------------···········-·······-·······--2 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT l: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGE-
MENT ENTERED MORE THAN ONE 
YEAR PRIOR TO THE TIME OF FIL-
ING THE t<.IOTION TO SET ASIDE ON 
THE GROUNDS OF A DEFECTIVE 
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS... 3 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
DISMISSING THE ACTION AFTER 
THE FILING OF A MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGEMENT 
WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS FIL-
ED AN ANSWER WITHOUT ORDER-
ING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF 
THE ACTION ---------------------------------------------- 8 
INDEX TO CITATIONS 
CASES 
Bish's Sheet Metal v. Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 
Page 
P.2d 21 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
Brockman v. Wagenbach, (Calif.) 313 P.2d 659 ____ 8 
E. E. Young v. Vemstrom, (Calif.) 79 P.2d 1117 __ 8 
Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, (Calif.) 23 P.2d 277 ________ 8 
Macbeth v. Macbeth, (Calif.) 25 P.2d 11 _____________ _ 
People v. Davis, (Calif.) 77 Pac. 651 ______________________ 8 
People v. McAllister, (Calif.) 76 Pac. '1127 ____________ 8 
People v. Wrin, (Calif.) 76 Pac. 646 ---------------------- 8 
Pierson v. Fischer, (Calif.) 280 P.2d 491 ________________ 8 
Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949 ________ 5, 7 
Vaughn v. Pine Creek Tungsten, (Calif.) 265 Pac. 
491 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Washko v. Stewart, (Calif.) 112 P.2d 306 ____________ 8 
TEXTS 
6 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 1837-1838 _______________ _ "' I 
STATUTES 
Rule 4 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________________ 6, 9 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________ 3-10 
Section 473a California Rules of Civil Procedure ____ 7, 9 
Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ____________________ 7 
Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure _______________ - --
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILL S. WOODY d.b.a. 
Woody Drilling Co. 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
BERT RHODES and 
VAUGHN RHODES 
Defendant and Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 11732 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF 
This is an action on a promissory note upon which 
Judgement by Default was obtained and fourteen months 
later the judgement was set aside and the matter dismis-
sed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court granted the defendant's motion to 
set aside a judgement by default and also dismissed the 
matter even though an answer had been filed by the de-
fendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. Plaintiff, Appellant, seeks of the order setting 
aside the Default Judgement or m the alternative an order 
reversing the dismissal of the matter so that the case may 
be tried on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on a promissory note on 
February 15, 1968 and on February 20, 1968 the sheriff 
reported that he had served the defendant Vaughn Rhodes 
by leaving him a copy of the Summons and Complaint 
with Mrs. Vaughn Rhodes (See Sheriff's Return). An 
attorney, James L. Wadsworth, from Pioche, Nevada, 
wrote plaintiff's attorney and said he represented Vaughn 
Rhodes and asked for a delay until April 1, 1968 in which 
to plead. No pleadings were received from defendant 
Vaughn Rhodes and his default was entered on April 1, 
1968and Judgement by default was taken on April 2, 1968 
and a copy of the judgement was mailed to Attorney 
Wadsworth. (The action against Bert Rhodes was dis-
missed without prejudice since he was a non-resident of 
Utah.) 
According to Defendant Vaughn Rhodes on February 
20, 1968 he did see the summons and complaint left with 
his wife but he did not learn that judgement had been 
taken until January 1969, at which time he contacted an 
attorney. Over three months later on April 29, 1969 a 
motion to set aside the default was filed together with an 
Answer and Counterclaim. The motion was based on Rule 
No. 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and defendant 
Vaughn Rhodes asked for an order setting the matter for 
trial. 
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At the hearing on the motion on May 13, 1969, no 
trstimony was presented in support of the motion but de-
fendant offered what purported to be the summons served 
on Mrs. Vaughn Rhodes which carried a notation that the 
summons was served on "Bert Rhodes" the 20th day of 
February, 1968. 
On June 17, 1969 the District Court signed an order 
setting aside the Default Judgement on the grounds that 
the deputy sheriff erroneously wrote the wrong defend-
ant's name on the summons left with defendant's wife and 
thus failed to provide defendant with notice required 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court 
also entered an order dismissing the matter even though 
defendant had filed an Answer and Counterclaim and had 
asked that the matter be set for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SET-
TING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT ENTERED 
MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE TIME OF 
FILING THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE ON THE 
GROUNDS OF A DEFECTIVE PERSONAL SERVICE 
OF SUMMONS. 
Plaintiff concedes that the Utah rule with regard to 
setting aside judgements obtained by default has been 
liberally construed to the end that there may be trial on 
the merits. But limitations of time have been established 
where a motion is made under certain circumstances. (See 
Rule 60 ( b ) ( 1 ) , ( 2), ( 3), and ( 4).) 
That there should be some limitation of time is ap-
parent from some background information in this case 
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which is not now being cited as evidence, but only to show 
a reason for a time limitation. 
Here an out of state plaintiff comes to Utah to obtain 
a judgement on a promissory note. In a country where it 
is estimated that one-fifth of our population moves every 
year, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Plaintiff recog-
nized that in this particular case there may be a trial on 
the question of consideration for the note and witnesses 
were located and statements taken showing the comple-
tion of the work contracted for, the existence of an undis-
closed principal who has a contractor's license under 
which plaintiff is operating by agreement and similar mat-
ters. Suit is filed, but the defendant does not answer even 
though defendant admits he received a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint and the sheriff's return is valid on its 
face. Default Judgement is taken and as required by Rule 
5 ( b) ( 1 ) a copy of the judgement is mailed to a person 
purporting to be defendant's attorney. 
In looking for assets on which plaintiff can enforce 
judgement it appears that a homestead exemption may be 
claimed if execution is issued immediately so plaintiff ' 
decides to give defendant an opportunity to enlarge his 
estate before judgement is collected. Since the judgement 
is regular on its face and not void, nor has it been satisfied, 
released or discharged, there appears to be no reason to 
keep in touch with witnesses after expiration of the three 
month period allowed for setting aside defaults on other 
grounds. 
Over a year after the judgement has been filed plain-
tiff is told defendant wants it set aside. Plantiff, who is 
a non-resident, is unable to understand why a defendant 
in Utah is given the right to wait until he perhaps decides 
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to sell his real estate, so that no judgement can be enforc-
ed and then have a judgement set aside so that if Plaintiff 
is able to prevail his judgement will be worth-
less. It seems that a diligent plaintiff should have some 
date on which he can say his judgement is valid in absence 
of a fraud upon the court or a void judgement where plain-
titf has a lien on real estate. 
Another reason for a time limitation on motions to set 
aside default judgements is the running of the statute of 
limitations. Or one might consider the situation under 
the new Uniform Consumer Credit Code where heavy 
penalitics arc imposed upon a lender for failure to make 
proper disclosures. If default judgements can be set aside 
without time limitation under the reasons listed in Rule 
60( b) ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), or ( 4) the present time limitation 
on retention of disclosure statements is extended from two 
years to an indefinite time. 
Of course the fact that the rule was enacted with a 
time limitation should be reason enough for its enforce-
ment. "Otherwise, the rule would not make much sense." 
(Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P2d 949.) 
This case seems to clearly fall within the provisions of 
Rule 60 ( b) ( 4). There is no question but that the sher-
iff's return shows service and that the Summons actually 
served was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4 ( j). 
There appears to be no requirement in the rules that the 
sheriff \\Tite the name of the person served on the sum-
mo11s and there was no evidence presented in the District 
CDurt as to who or at what time the name of Bert Rhodes 
was written on the summons. But since the lower court 
held for defendant we must assume that the deputy sher-
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iff did write the brother's name on the summons when it 
was handed to Vaughn Rhodes' wife and that this invali-
dated the personal service of the summons under Rule 
( 4). This then is a case where for any cause the defend. 
ant was not personally served, but this is not a case where 
the defendant lacked actual notice that a complaint had 
been filed in which he was named as a defendant. The 
summons clearly indicated Vaughn Rhodes was a party 
defendant and he admits that he saw the Summons in his 
affidavit filed with his motion. The record shows a letter 
from an attorney purporting to represent Vaughn Rhodes 
indicating that an attorney was contacted. This then 
seems to be a case which clearly would fall within Rule 60 
( b) ( 4) for the Court's consideration "when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally ' 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4 ( e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said action." 
But Rule 60 (b) says the Court may not consider a 
motion made under this section since it must be made 
within three months after the judgement was entered. 
The Rule puts the burden of making inquiry on the de-
fendant. No inquiry was made. The defendant admits 
he saw the summons the day it was served, February 20, 
1968. The defendant's attorney was mailed a copy of the 
judgement in April 1968, and the defendant himself ad· 
mits in his affidavit that he learned of the judgement in 
January 1969. Even if we excuse the defendant for the 
apparent failure of his attorney to make contact, his 0\\11 
admission makes it more than three months after learning 
of the judgement until he files his motion to set the same 




Rule 6 ( b) says the District Court has no power to 
t d the time limit provided by Rule 60 ( b) and the ex en 
Utah Supreme Court has also so stated. See Shaw v. 
Pilcher, g Utah 2d 222, 241 P. 2d 949 where the .said 
that a motion based on the grounds enumerated is mef-
frctive if made three months after the decision from which 
relief is sought." There the Court required the filing of a 
new action and the paying of a filing fee and the service 
of process if the judgement was to be attacked. If the 
<lefedant is dilatory in preserving his rights, he should 
have the burden of seeking the other party in his own 
jurisdiction, and not compel him to again come over 500 
miles with his witness to prove what he wanted to prove 
when he first filed his complaint. 
The decision in Shaw v. Pilcher, supra., is in agree-
ment with the uniform rule in the Federal Courts from 
which most of Rule 60(b) was taken. See 6 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice, p. 1837-1838, motion made after time limita-
tion must be denied as a matter of law. 
There is no comparable rule to 60 ( b) ( 4) in the 
Federal Rules but it appears that this subsection was taken 
from the California Civil Procedure. See Section 473a of 
the California Rules of Civl Procedure. 
The cases cited in California all hold that the motion 
madP under this provision (i.e. where for any reason the 
defendant is not personally served and he fails to appear) 
must be made within one year as provided in the Califor-
i 11a rule or the court is without jurisdiction to hear a mo-
tion to set aside the default. When the Utah Supreme 
Court adopted the California rule the time limitation was 
reclucrd to three months and it is submitted that it was 
not intended to give the defaulting defendant any more 
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time in view of the following decisions of the State of Cali. 
fornia interpreting their rule: People v. Davis, 77 Pac, 
651, and 77 Pac. 1132 (The court has no power to set aside 
a judgement not void upon its face after the expiration of 
one year.); People v. Wrin, 76 Pac. 646; People v. McAllis. 
ter, 76 Pac. 1127; Washko v. Stewart, 112 P.2d 306; E. E. 
Young v. Fernstrom, 79 P. 2d 1117; Macbeth v. Macbeth. 
25 P. 2d l'l; Vaughn v. Pine Creek Tungeston Co., 26.5 
Pac. 491. 
In fact the rule in Californa seems to be that where 
the defendant had actual notice that the suit had been 
commenced and he did nothing but refer the matter to an 
attorney, he cannot even ask that the default be set aside 
within the one year period because of his laches. See 
Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, (Calif.) 23 P. 2d 277; Pierson v. 
Fischer, (Calif.) 280 P. 2d 491; and see the discussion of 
the rule in Brockman v. Wagenbach, (Calif.) 313 P.2d 659 
where the court did not find laches. The lower court did 
not make a finding that the default judgement was void, 
or that it had been satisfied, released or discharged, which 
is necessary if there is to be no time limitaion of three 
months as provided in Rule 60 ( b) ( 5) and ( 6). The 
lower court did not find "any other reason" than the defect 
in personal service of summons which is necessary to avoid 
the three month time Imitation and proceed under Rule 
60 (b) (7). Rule 60 (b) (7) requires a reason other than 
the defect in personal service of summons or the other 
reasons listed in Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) through ( 6) before it 
can be used by the Court. See Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. 
Luras, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P. 2d 21. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DIS 
MISSING THE ACTION AFTER THE FILING OF A 
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TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGE-
\!ENT WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS FILED AN 
ANSWEH WITHOUT ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE 
OF THE ACTION. 
Naturally plaintiff prefers a decison under point I 
because under the precedents set in California it appears 
that the District Court had no jursdiction to hear a motion 
made under Rule 60 ( b) ( 4) after the expiration of the 
period of three months after the judgement had been en-
tered. But if the Court agrees with the District Court that 
this Rule may be set aside on some equitable principle, 
and holds that the trial court can disregard the time limi-
tation notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 6(b ), then 
plaintiff submits that the same equity should permit a trial 
on the merits. The Court dismissed the matter under Rule 
.55( c) and 60 ( b). Plaintiff has read and re-read these 
rules and the decisions made thereunder, but has found 
no authority for a trial court to dismiss an action on a 
motion to set aside a default. Surely plaintiff is entitled 
to his day in Court even though he is a non-resident. Per-
hapc; the District Court felt that because there was no 
personal service of summons under Rule 4, the complaint 
must be dismissed under Rule 4 ( b). But, if so, the Court 
overlooked the fact that defendant filed an answer and 
counterclaim on April 29, 1969 and no defense under Rule 
4 ( b ) is raised in the answer. 
And it is not clear whether the Court's dismissal is 
with or without prejudice. Plaintiff should be entitled to 
consideration for the results of his labor in drilling the well 
for defendant and should be entitled to his day in court to 
present his evidence proving such consideration where he 
lias pr<>ved a prima facie case before the Court and obtain-
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ed a judgement, even if the Court should decide that Rule 
60 ( b) ( 4) is not applicable to this situation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ted S. Perry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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